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ABSTRACT
Cellular spectrum is a limited natural resource becoming scarcer at a worrisome rate. To satisfy
users’ expectation from wireless data services, researchers and practitioners recognized the neces-
sity of more utilization and pervasive sharing of the spectrum. Though scarce, spectrum is under-
utilized in some areas or within certain operating hours due to the lack of appropriate regulatory
policies, static allocation and emerging business challenges. Thus, finding ways to improve the
utilization of this resource to make sharing more pervasive is of great importance. There already
exists a number of solutions to increase spectrum utilization via increased sharing. Dynamic Spec-
trum Access (DSA) enables a cellular operator to participate in spectrum sharing in many ways,
such as geological database and cognitive radios, but these systems perform spectrum sharing at
the secondary level (i.e., the bands are shared if and only if the primary/licensed user is idle) and
it is questionable if they will be sufficient to meet the future expectations of the spectral efficiency.
Along with the secondary sharing, spectrum sharing among primary users is emerging as a new
domain of future mode of pervasive sharing. We call this type of spectrum sharing among primary
users as “pervasive spectrum sharing (PSS)”. However, such spectrum sharing among primary
users requires strong incentives to share and ensuring a freeriding-free cellular market.
Freeriding in pervasively shared spectrum markets (be it via government subsidies/regulations or
self-motivated coalitions among cellular operators) is a real techno-economic challenge to be ad-
dressed. In a PSS market, operators will share their resources with primary users of other operators
and may sometimes have to block their own primary users in order to attain sharing goals. Small
operators with lower quality service may freeride on large operators’ infrastructure in such perva-
sively shared markets. Even worse, since small operators’ users may perceive higher-than-expected
service quality for a lower fee, this can cause customer loss to the large operators and motivate
small operators to continue freeriding with additional earnings from the stolen customers. Thus,
iii
freeriding can drive a shared spectrum market to an unhealthy and unstable equilibrium. In this
work, we model the freeriding by small operators in shared spectrum markets via a game-theoretic
framework. We focus on a performance-based government incentivize scheme and aim to mini-
mize the freeriding issue emerging in such PSS markets. We present insights from the model and
discuss policy and regulatory challenges.
iv
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Day by day, the number of wireless mobile devices is increasing at an astonishing rate. According
to [3], the number of cellular devices will hit to 24 billion by 2020. However, allocated spectrum
for this kind of devices is finite, i.g., spectrum allocation in the US, Fig. 1.1 and the wireless
spectrum is becoming scarce. The radio spectrum is a precious natural resource for our societies.
The wireless/cellular service providers license spectrum bands after a competitive auction process
arranged by a government authorized organization in different parts of the world such as the Federal
Commission on Communications (FCC) in the U.S. Following such competitive process to gain
the rights to operate their network on a particular band, the service providers do not want to share
their spectrum bands with others unless they are financially benefited. Although we need more
spectrum availability as societies, such economic and policy divisions limit our ability to utilize
the spectrum.
Several schemes have already been taken to increase spectrum utilization, e.g., dynamic spectrum
allocation to secondary providers, data roaming, and data offloading to neighboring networks.
These techniques aim to share the spectrum on a secondary basis, i.e., only when the primary owner
of the band is idle. Though secondary spectrum allocation has increased spectrum utilization, they
focus more on providers’ incentive than the actual end-users’. Thus, the main notion of spectrum
sharing has been to utilize whatever is left from the primary user. Recent efforts are to take this
sharing to primary level where sharing takes place even though the primary user may be busy.
Such “aggressive” sharing seems necessary for optimizing “micro-opportunities” arising in radio
propagation and maximizing overall users’ wireless experience. For instance, one might go into
dark spots even though his operator’s coverage has the best overall quality. Such users in dark
spots of their own provider could be served by another provider as a primary user, but this requires
a new and extensive form of spectrum sharing among providers and users [4].
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Figure 1.1: Spectrum Allocation in the US [1]
Aligned with these trends, the vision from U.S. National Broadband Plan (NBP) [5] and the di-
rection wireless community is taking point to regimes where sharing is the norm and pervasive
[4]. Such notion of pervasive sharing introduces the problem of freeriding. If strong providers
are incentivized to share their spectrum bands with the users of weak providers, there may arise a
tendency in the weak providers to freeride. In this thesis, we tackle this issue and explore regimes
where freeriding can be minimized in spectrum markets shared at primary level.
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Sprint	Coverage Verizon	Coverage
Figure 1.2: Overlapping Coverage Map [2]
A key challenge in primary spectrum sharing is the regulation of such markets. The only economic
framework for primary level sharing (or cooperation) among wireless providers is roaming, [6].
A nice feature of roaming is that it does not require any governmental regulation. But, it works
well only between providers with significantly non-overlapping coverage. To reap the benefits of
spectrum sharing at smaller scales and utilize micro-opportunities for improving user experience,
we need incentivized mechanisms for providers that may be competing with each other on over-
lapping regions of coverage. Fig. 1.2 shows a real-world example of signal strength difference
between two providers within a small area. From this figure, we observe that provider Sprint and
Verizon has overlapping coverage in University of Central Florida (UCF) area. However, in some
places of UCF, a Sprint customer may find himself out of coverage or get weak coverage. At the
same time, a Verizon customer is expected to enjoy seamless connectivity because of Verizon’s
better coverage. If we consider all overlapping areas within the US, we can find a large number of
places where such differences are obvious. If there existed some primary level spectrum sharing,
3
customers of all providers may have the opportunity to enjoy the much-improved signal coverage.
One way to attain such cooperation among competing providers is to inject some governmental
or semi-governmental regulation, although other motivations to improve the “larger good“ (e.g.,
public safety) do exist.
Recently, the idea of government subsidizing of spectrum bands picked up attention [7, 8]. In
one particular spectrum subsidization scheme [7, 9], the government plays a vital role to provide
subsidy to the service providers. As providers get subsidy on their allocated spectrum, they get
more freedom to improve their infrastructure and can provide better service without charging more
to end-users. In this way, spectrum subsidy aims to maximize users’ welfare. Providers get subsidy
on the basis of Proof-of-Sharing, where a provider serves clients of other providers whose network
coverage is not available or have weaker signal in a certain time and region.
We focus on this subsidy-based spectrum markets to develop a model to minimize freeriding.
Despite its benefits in increasing primary level sharing, the subsidy-based spectrum management
opens a tunnel for weaker providers to earn more money by relying on strong providers, and hence
may negatively affect the healthy competition in the existing market. When a weak provider partic-
ipates in the subsidy-based market, it can advertise relatively smaller subscription fees compared
to the strong providers and can “steal” the customers who would go to the strong providers in a
fair market. Since strong providers are motivated to serve the users of the weak providers in return
of more subsidy from the government, the weak providers may exploit this situation by offering
less-than-fair subscription fees and tend to freeride on the strong providers’ network infrastructure.
Further, since strong providers have larger maintenance costs, they will not be able to drop their
subscription fees under a certain level and may not prevent their potential customers to be stolen
by the weak providers. We address this freeriding issue in spectrum markets heavily shared at
the primary level and offer guidelines to providers as well as the government so as to minimize
freeriding.
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We develop a game-theoretic framework that can predict the strategies which should be taken by
a provider in various circumstances of the subsidy-based spectrum sharing (SBSS) markets. A
provider can include SBSS market parameters and run the model which will suggest appropriate
strategies for that moment. If the initial number of base stations of two providers are 70 and 30
respectively, customers price averseness in the market is 0.9 and marginal signal improvement is
0.8 (all detailed in Chapter 5), our game simulation makes the large provider serve other providers’
customers using a pure strategy when its willingness to share is at most 69% whatever the subsidy
amount was given. If its willingness to share is more than 69%, it plays mixed strategy to ensure
no revenue loss from freeriding. Now, if the strong provider’s willingness to share is 0.8 and if the
ratio of the small provider’s fee to the fair market fee is below or equal to 41%, the large provider
can operate sharing its infrastructure at any level, i.e., willingness to share being 1. Again, when the
fees ratio is greater than 41%, the game converges to a mixed strategy to ensure market healthiness.
Based on the subsidy amount given to the large provider, the mixed strategy varies. If the large
provider is given too much subsidy, the game can end up in a freeriding regime. This gives us
an idea of how much subsidy can be given to the large provider to avoid a freeriding equilibrium.
If there exists a chance of higher signal improvement for both providers, a bit of subsidy can
motivate a provider for more sharing (described in Chapter 5). Finally, due to customers’ high
price averseness, we observe that a spectrum sharing provider is more interested to play mixed
strategy.
1.1 Motivations
Existing cellular roaming or DSA is inadequate to provide the benefits of spectrum sharing where
a cellular user goes temporarily out of coverage or experiences weak coverage. We have already
seen an example, Fig 1.2, where current spectrum allocations cannot provide the service to the
customers of different primary providers to get the advantages of spectrum sharing. Hence, we
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require a spectrum shared market where the providers are motivated to share and the customers
enjoy maximum services from the sharing. We need to design a system that allows providers to
trust the overall market norms that their customers will not be affected both in terms of numbers
and services. Since different providers have various types of investments on the infrastructure,
there should be an attractive way of incentivizing them for sharing the spectrum. Without any
incentive, no provider will be motivated to share their valuable spectrum. Roaming-like pay-per-
use framework may work for such pervasive spectrum sharing markets. However, users are going
to pay the roaming charges at the end. If they have to do this for their daily cellular use, they may
not find interest in this framework for the long run. So, we need a framework where cellular users
will get the advantage of pervasive spectrum sharing without any additional fees and providers
are motivated to share spectrum resources. We choose government subsidized spectrum shared
market where providers are incentivized based on their sharing. As the subsidy money is coming
from the taxpayers, there may arise some questions among taxpayers, e.g., why their tax should be
given to the providers? The answer lies in the case where the government will give subsidy only to
the providers who have actually shared their spectrum resources with other providers’ customers.
If a provider doesn’t participate in sharing then he won’t get any subsidy. If no such regulation
exists, providers may charge higher pay-per-use fees and customers are obliged to pay for such
services. If the government takes care of giving the incentive of the providers, customers do not
need to worry about additional charges. However, this subsidy may create a situation where smaller
providers may not find interest to invest in infrastructure improvement as they already know other
strong providers will take care of their customers. Also, they may ask lower subscription fees to
attract new customers. Which is legal and valid in any free market. No regulatory module can
fix the lower bounds of the subscription fees. So, we need an effective framework to control such
freeriders while maximizing spectrum sharing. We choose a game-theoretic framework to suggest
to the providers’ how much sharing should be done for any particular circumstance to avoid the
adverse effect of freeriding. We also suggest how much subsidy should be given to the provider
6
who is sharing to avoid freeriding. We aim to maintain market healthiness with maximizing user
welfare while minimizing freeriding to motivate providers for spectrum sharing.
1.2 Contributions
Major contributions of this work to minimize freeriding in shared spectrum market at the primary
level are as follows:
• We develop a game-theoretic approach to share the spectrum at primary level while mini-
mizing freeriding.
• We formulated case-wise games, and calculated the Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategies and
payoffs for each provider in a two-player scenario with one small and one large provider.
• Our game-theoretic model is able to determine the maximum sharing by the large provider
without freeriding considering other conditions remain unchanged.
• Our game-theoretic model can prevent or reduce the small provider’s freeriding opportunities
by adjusting the subsidy given to the large provider.
• Also, to minimizing freeriding, our model sheds light on how to regulate providers’ sub-
scription fees (i.e., service prices) with respect to fair market fees.
• The game framework identifies operational regimes where the large provider earns at least
its regular earnings (without spectrum sharing) irrespective of its willingness to share and
the small provider’s strategy to steal customers and freeride.
• Unless both the small and the large provider enters into the freeriding Pure Strategy Nash
Equilibrium (PSNE) region (explained later in Section 5) due to the excessive subsidy which
7
was given to the large provider, we show the existence of operational regimes without freerid-
ing. Before reaching this condition, the large provider can ensure at least its regular earning
by playing a mixed strategy or a freeriding-free pure strategy. This condition ensures both
providers maintain market healthiness in the shared spectrum market.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we explore existing literature on spec-
trum sharing. Here, we cover related works on Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) for secondary
spectrum sharing and auctioning procedures for such spectrum sharing, freeriding behaviors in net-
works, roaming models and associated regulatory policies to increase spectrum utilization. How
government subsidy can contribute to increase sharing among primary providers without asking
additional fees from customers was described in Chapter 3. It shows how a provider can behave
maliciously, freeride on other providers infrastructure and trigger unfair customer switching. It
also outlines a baseline model of an SBSS market and spectrum sharing among primary opera-
tors. Chapter 4 illustrates a game-theoretic model of two providers in an SBSS market. It also
describes different scenarios of the game depending on small providers’ subscription fees, large
providers’ willingness to share and associated equilibrium strategies for both providers to control
unfair customer switching. Chapter 5 shows the results of this thesis work. Here, we illustrated the
equilibrium strategies of both providers based on different subsidy amount. We have differentiated
the game regions between freeriding and non-freeriding. We also show, how additional subsidy
can restart freeriding game regions. In this chapter, customers price averseness effect on market
was also examined in details. Finally, in Chapter 6, we have summarized our work and indicated
future improvements on this work.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Spectrum efficiency by any means has become a key concern due to its increasing scarcity. Sev-
eral advanced methods have been introduced to increase spectrum utilization and the efficiency of
spectrum sharing, such as auctions, dynamic pricing, dynamic spectrum access, and a recent form
of spectrum sharing among primary operators.
2.1 Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) and Auction
Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) with truthful auction mechanism where secondary providers get
spectrum in the form of certain fine-grained space-time unit was proposed in [10]. With this
spectrum, secondary providers can introduce new service or improve its existing services to meet
high demands from customers. Aiming at increasing primary providers’ revenue from auctions,
the authors discussed several auction procedures, e.g., Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism
was used to maximize revenue and enforcing truthfulness. They also discussed polynomial time
suboptimal auctions where monotone allocations and critical value payment was considered for
enforcing truthfulness. The strength of this work was providing high revenue to the sellers which
motivates a primary provider to share its spectrum and high spectrum utilization within the whole
system.
Due to location-constrained interference, truthful auction becomes challenging. In some cases, it
fails to address truthfulness and loss on spectrum utilization. In order to resolve this situation and
reduce computation time, [11] described approximate truthfulness and proposed ETEX, a mecha-
nism used to run seal-bid auction mechanism ensuring approximate truthfulness. The polynomial
solution of ETEX outperforms some existing auction procedures in terms of user satisfaction,
spectrum utilization.
9
Dynamic spectrum allocation and pricing based on sealed-bid knapsack auction was illustrated in
[12]. Unlike to static allocation, service providers are offered a common pool of spectrum resource
to bid. Providers bid for spectrum based on the necessity of growing users. Here, they developed a
two-tier trading system where providers get spectrum from spectrum owners and provide spectrum
services to users. The paradigm shift of static to dynamic spectrum allocation using sealed-bid
knapsack auction from a common pool of spectrum resources with the help of a spectrum broker
strengthened their work from the rest.
Withstanding interference by primary operators during secondary spectrum sharing was addressed
in [13]. It analyzed the sharing in cooperative and coexistent manner. In the coexisting process,
a secondary provider is allowed to transmit power without causing any harmful interference by
making a query to a sensor network rather than direct communication with the primary network.
This sensor network monitors primary’s downstream communication and estimate upstream com-
munications. Finally, the sensor network adjusts the interference tolerance level and shares this
tolerance data with the secondary network when asked for.
Spectrum sharing with secondary users (SUs) under acceptable interference levels with primary
user’s receiver (PU-Rx) was introduced in [14]. According to it, a secondary link has multiple
transmitters (SU-Tx) and single receiver (SU-Rx). SU-Tx broadcasts random beams to all avail-
able primary spectra, after receiving this beams a PU-Rx decides to send back information with
interference level. Based on this return information, SU-Tx selects a set of beams with satisfying
PUs interference and starts communication with SU-Rx over this beams. During the modeling,
authors have considered three cases. Those are, interference level based on magnitude and phase,
magnitude only, and a q-bit representation of its magnitude. For q-bit case, it finds the optimal
quantizer thresholds and an optimal interference level for each quantization interval in a mean
square error (MSE) sense. The strength of this work lies in the opportunistic beam-formation
without excessive channel state information (CSI) feedback.
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Spot pricing of the spectrum with the presence of nonelastic primary users, and elastic secondary
users was discussed in [15]. The view of horizon reward problem and the stochastic dynamic
solution of this show an efficient single pricing policy. Based on customer arrival, this model
differentiates operating regions for different pricing policies. Their single-price deterministic op-
timal threshold pricing reaches near to globally optimal price. It uses unimodal profit function for
threshold pricing. The weakness of this work is the single-pricing policy. The optimal price can
changes over time depending on the channel occupancy which can make the spectrum access less
predictable.
End-users’ provider selection based on the sum of congestion and price announcement by primary
and secondary providers was addressed in [16]. It assumes the congestion of primary provider is
caused by its’ subscribers and the congestion of secondary providers occurs with the presence of
both subscribers.
2.2 Freeriding in Networks
Utility and extended point based freeriding control in peer to peer (P2P) system have been de-
scribed in [17, 18]. Both research works consider the negative impact of freeriding in P2P file
sharing, and they develop a model to study various patterns of file sharing behaviors among shar-
ers and its impact on the community. They model a utility-based freeriding control scheme to
provide an incentive to the users who share interesting and popular files. Here, they have consid-
ered the total number of files shared, the total size of the data, and the popularity of shared data, and
they penalized users based on these. Their work differs from the other incentive-based freeriding
control scheme in term of considering parameters to calculate incentive. They determine incentive
points after taking care how much time a user spends in the network, his/her upload speed, how
many simultaneous uploads are done by a user.
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Minimizing freeriding in P2P networks using EigenTrust [19, 20] score has been introduced in,
[21]. EigenTrust is a reputation-based metric for P2P networks. It assigns scores to each partici-
pating peer. Peers with higher EigenTrust score get additional benefits, e.g., more bandwidth, and
more connection time while downloading or uploading data. Peers with a zero EigenTrust score
are treated as freerider. If any peer is sharing popular content and a freerider wants to access that
data, this model will restrict access to freerider. The strength of EigenTrust lies in determining dif-
ferent types of malicious freeriders where freeriders can act alone or collective manner. EigenTrust
also determines malicious spies and camouflaged freeriders with high probability. It is effective
against Sybil attack and virus-disseminators.
Freeriding control using passive monitoring neighbor nodes in the P2P network was proposed in
[22]. A peer is a ‘monitor’ and at the same time ‘controlled’. As a monitor, it observes neighbors’
incoming and outgoing messages, and keeps statistical records of the number of data. The observ-
ing neighbor is called controlled peer. Monitoring peer is also being controlled by its neighbors as
well. By monitoring each other’s sharing amount and message passing record, a peer can decide
the freeriding characteristic of its neighbors and take countermeasures to reduce freeriding effect
in the network.
Payment-based freeriding control is another way to prevent freeriding in P2P systems. Two decen-
tralized payment methods were delineated in [23], (1) sender uploads the required payments and
each intermediate node earns a portion of it when the packet traverses through the node, and (2)
each node buys a packet from the previous node and sells to the next node, finally, the receiver
pays the total cost.
Agent-based dynamic freeriding was well investigated in [24, 25]. The contribution of one agent is
decreasing with the increase of others’ contributions. If equilibrium forces one agent to contribute
more, then others reduce their contribution by the same amount in the aggregate.
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2.3 Regulations for Spectrum Utilization
To meet the growing need of spectrum utilization, regulatory modules around the world (e.g.,
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the US, European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) in Europe) revise their regulatory policies regularly. Researchers on spectrum
regulations are working actively to propose new sharing policies and help these regulatory modules
to implement effective regulations for all participating network providers.
European Parliament and Council approved the first Radio Spectrum Policy Program (RSSP) in
March 2012, [26, 27]. It aimed to implement two actions: (1) identifying beneficial sharing oppor-
tunities (BSOs) where net socio-economic benefits of multiple applications sharing a band surpass
socio-economic benefits of a single application, (2) authorizing Licensed Shared spectrum Access
(LSA) via spectrum sharing contracts with regulators handing out. A commission was formed to
implement this two actions within European Union (EU) which acts as impartial technical advisers
and registrars of the contract terms. The LSA users will use available unused cellular spectrum
with temporary exclusive rights and role in a specific area.
International roaming is supported by almost all Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). To make
data and voice roaming easier for cellular users, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic
Communications (BEREC) has launched some regulation proposals, [28, 29, 30]. International
mobile data roaming charge overhead on traveling cellular users within the European Union (EU)
were analyzed in that proposal. It also analyzes the applicability of flat-rate pricing for roaming
to reduce user burden and evaluate the three structural measurements proposed by European Com-
mission (EC). They have considered the impact of competition, wholesale prices, retail prices,
operators’ investment for network infrastructure and finally, increase spectrum utilization.
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The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) in the US, proposed
a three-tier interference protection (Incumbent, Priority Access License (PAL), and General Au-
thorized Access (GAA)), [31, 32], for utilizing spectrum allocations and obtaining incentive from
spectrum market. This proposal allows commercial access of federal spectrum (3550 - 3700 MHz
band) while protecting federal operations from interference. It also makes a way for the commer-
cial users to upgrade their own technology to use their intended purpose. This federal spectrum
sharing concept was termed as Spectrum Access System (SAS) which coordinates between mul-
tiple tiers of spectrum users. Federal ship-borne, radar operations, and fixed satellite services are
included in the protected incumbent list. They are the highest tier and are protected from interfer-
ence due to other users. Any non-federal incumbents are required to register their operation details
with FCC or a SAS. PAL and GAA are authorized by SAS to use federal spectrum in specific
locations. PAL users are protected from the interference created by GAA. A PAL user can have
access up to 70MHz from 3550 - 3650 MHz bands. A GAA user can use the band which is not
assigned to any PAL user between this range.
The authors of [33] describe a two-stage pricing policy based on PCAST’s 3-tiers interference
protection policy. At the first stage, it takes static pricing policy for the specific level of commercial
usage. The later stage was done by an optimal dynamic policy for controlling new admissions. This
combination works efficiently for spectrum sharing without requiring additional spectrum, makes
stable revenues for networks and provides the ability to adopt any change in the network.
Regulating Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) cognitive radio spectrum sharing, a simple rule
framework consisting of six themes was proposed in [34]. The themes are: (1) The nature of the
opportunity rule, (2) rules for conducting cellular business, (3) boundary rules to identify bound-
aries of the business, (4) priority ranking rules to differentiate critical to general decisions. (5)
timing rules to identify, synchronize and pace things, and (6) exits rules to make the decision for
exit or selecting things which should be stopped or given up. These simple rules help dominating
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and challenger MNOs to reform their business policy, such as a dominator can enhance small cell
deployments to provider good QoS and traffic offloading, acting as a cognitive platform provider
for other providers and a challenger can focus on specializing in governmental, enterprise cus-
tomers, special mobile devices, Internet of Things (IoT) based operations to increase spectrum
utilization.
Mobile service, technology, network value provisions were illustrated in [35]. To meet the best ef-
fort service delivery, operators should have the infrastructure for next-generation communication
services such as real-time video. Certain regulatory and operations restrictions should be taken
into consideration while allocating additional spectrum to the mobile network operators (MNO).
In technology provision, LTE Time Division Duplex (TDD) is well suited for DL/UL asymmetric
traffic with small applications though LTE Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) is used as the main-
stream cellular networks. For value provisioning, a mobile business model should have the value
proposition, revenue model, and architectural value provisioning.
2.4 Spectrum Sharing at Primary Level
Co-primary spectrum sharing in a decentralized way using Gibbs sampling based learning tech-
niques was proposed in [36] with the goal of long-term spectrum sharing among small cell base
stations from a common pool of spectrum resources. This Gibbs sampling based learning algo-
rithm provides tenfold throughput gain compared to greedy or equal spectrum sharing algorithms
among providers.
With the goal of maximizing social welfare in multi-operator spectrum sharing, [37] proposed
a non-orthogonal spectrum allocation which is essentially a combinatorial optimization problem.
They adopt a many-to-one form of a matching game to find a stable matching solution which
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correspondence to local optima. They also use generic Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method to reach global optima which ensures the maximum social welfare. From their simulation,
they also showed the significance of effective spectrum resource allocation over power allocation
for social welfare system.
Spectrum sharing with the inter-operator device-to-device (D2D) communications capability was
discussed in [38]. In this work, the authors create a common pool of spectrum resource from all
operators’ underutilized spectrums and play a non-cooperative game between providers to share
their spectrum. They use Jacobi-play strategy instead of the best response for ensuring game
equilibrium.
Authors of [39] constructed a protocol of asking and receiving spectrum resources in the form of
favors. Any provider with the high load of users can ask favors from low loaded providers. Each
of them keeps track of such favors. One favor gainer is expected to return the favor when others
needed help. The authors proposed a repeated game to keep track for granting future favors. This
work requires no monetary transaction for spectrum sharing and it doesn’t reveal any operator
specific information, which is the strength of this work.
Bidirectional spectrum sharing in the forms of multiplexing secondary users’ communication with
both primary and secondary users are described in [40]. The transmission times are divided into
two time slots without interrupting spectrum sharing primary users’ (PU) communication. In one
time slot, a secondary user can act as a relay for primary users’ transmission if the destination
primary users are out of reach for the sender. On another time slot, an SU can communicate with
another SU device as well as with a PU using two different links. Such simultaneous bidirectional
communication protocol allows an SU to utilize spectrum more efficiently compared to the existing
one-directional scheme without interfering PUs link.
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The viability of spectrum sharing in millimeter-wave (mmWave) cellular networks was discussed
in [41, 42]. They use cell association, coordination, beam forming, and bandwidth to analyze the
effectiveness of such spectrum sharing as an alternate of traditional spectrum sharing. Its’ math-
ematical framework integrates beam formation with the base stations focusing on maximizing
throughput with guaranteed load balancing. Inter-operator coordination or without any coordi-
nation, this work discussed five key points. It shows (1) the feasibility of inter-operator spectrum
sharing with light on-demand intra- and inter-operator coordination at higher mmWave frequencies
(e.g. 73 GHz), (2) issues with directional communication (such as multiuser interference), (3) how
a large number of antenna elements can be helpful for coordinating and simplifying spectrum shar-
ing implementation, (4) how fair load balancing can be done in intra-operator coordination while
neglecting inter-operator coordination in large antenna regimes, and finally, (5) how to protect
critical information from the adverse effects of spectrum sharing by implementing critical control
messages.
Two cooperative game models to address the user throughput, MNO markets, coalition cost and
mobile data pricing was addressed in [43]. It finds a cooperative game between MNOs with sharing
unique RAN for gaining spectrum aggregation and cost reduction. In this model, MNOs with large
customer base are responsible for a larger fraction of the network cost while MNOs with larger
spectrum resource should share the lower cost. Market share-based cost divisions’ stability is not
always guaranteed. Due to this instability, cost division based on spectrum contribution of each
MNO makes this work as a better candidate for cost division policy.
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CHAPTER 3: SBSS: SUBSIDY-BASED SPECTRUM SHARING
Earlier research on spectrum sharing has helped to increase spectrum utilization. Still, there re-
mains space for more utilization if the sharing can be done among primary providers. This can
increase end-user welfare as well. Though DSA increases the network availability, it considers
less of the economic benefits for the users. Due to the roaming agreements between the home
provider (i.e., the provider the user is subscribed to) and the foreign providers (i.e., providers the
user is not subscribed to), users have to pay more than regular fees, [6]. In the SBSS markets, a
explicit subsidy/incentive from the government or implicit subsidy/incentive from mutually bene-
ficial relationships of providers can contribute to increasing user welfare. The external subsidizing
organization can be a governmental, semi-governmental (e.g., similar to ISOs in power grid [44]),
or an organization of providers who want to motivate providers to share. The explicit subsidy can
come in a form of monetary benefit, low tax, or low license renewal fee whilst the implicit incen-
tive can come in terms of favors, i.e., peering between different providers. In all these cases of
SBSS markets, the end users will not need to pay more subscription fees for service when they
are in suburban areas or out of their provider’s coverage. Further, they will receive a better quality
of experience due to micro-opportunities arising in urban settings. Thus, putting the end user’s
received quality of experience as the top priority is one of the main motivations for our work on
SBSS markets. However, this subsidy scheme is still in academic research phase.
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Figure 3.1: An SBSS Market
An SBSS market operating within a region is visualized in Fig. 3.1. Here, the subsidizing organi-
zation (SO), customers and the providers have specific roles to play. The customers act similar to
the existing spectrum market. They choose providers based on the utility of the offered services.
SO subsidizes the providers to share their spectrum with foreign customers (i.e., ones subscribed
to another provider) and penalizes based on proof-of-sharing. The providers try to maximize rev-
enue earnings by serving as many foreign calls as they can without hurting their service quality.
However, such explicit SBSS can result in a situation that provides an opportunity to the weaker
provider to freeride on the stronger providers’ infrastructure and unfairly attract customers by of-
fering lower-than-fair subscription fees. We will next explain how such unfair customer switching
can emerge due to freeriding.
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3.1 Freeriding and Unfair Customer Switching (UCS)
SBSS opens a tunnel for weaker providers to earn more money by relying on strong providers, and
hence may negatively affect healthy competition in the existing market. When a weak provider
participates in the SBSS market, it can advertise relatively smaller subscription fees compared
to the strong providers and can unfairly attract customers who would normally go to the strong
providers in a fair market. Since strong providers are motivated to serve the users of the weak
providers because of the extra subsidy, the weak providers may exploit this situation and tend to
freeride on the strong providers’ network infrastructure. Further, since strong providers have larger
maintenance costs, they will not be able to drop their subscription fees below a certain level, and
may not retain their potential customers who eventually switch to other providers offering lower
fees.
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Figure 3.2: Provider’s Signal Strength by Coverage Area
In [7], the authors considered the benefits of an SBSS market. However, they didn’t analyze the
potential risks of the equilibrium in such markets. Let’s consider an explicit SBSS cellular market
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with Providers I and II. Fig. 3.2 shows the regions where these providers’ strong coverage exists.
Here, each small circle denotes a base station (BS). The dashed circles encapsulate each of the
providers’ dominated regions. Some regions are equally dominated by both providers while others
dominated by one of them. Provider I is, overall, stronger as it has more BS infrastructure than II.
In a normal market, Provider I’s subscription fees would be higher due to its higher infrastructure
costs. Due to the explicit subsidy in the SBSS market, all providers are motivated to serve each
others’ customers when it is needed.
Let’s consider a region where Provider I has better network coverage. If a customer wants to get
a strong connection, he should subscribe to Provider I in a normal market. In fact, if there was no
explicit subsidy, Provider I would retain these customers. However, under the SBSS market, the
weaker one, Provider II, can offer cheaper subscription fees due to its smaller infrastructure costs
compared to Provider I. Further, Provider I is incentivized to serve Provider II’s customers. Thus, if
Provider I shares its BSes with Provider II’s customers too much, the overall quality of the network
service will appear to be similar for both Provider I’s and II’s subscribers. Then, for the customers,
the only difference between two providers will be the subscription fees. This fee difference along
with similar service quality will cause unfair customer switching (UCS) to weak provider, Provider
II. To make it fair, Provider II should increase its fees to fair market levels (i.e., similar to I’s fees),
but it has no motivation to do so in the SBSS market. Due to this potential revenue loss from
freeriding weak providers, no strong provider will agree to join the SBSS market. We address
this freeriding and UCS issues in the explicit SBSS markets. We aim to minimize such freeriding
to maintain SBSS market healthiness while increasing user welfare via subsidized sharing of the
scarce spectrum.
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3.2 A Baseline Model for SBSS Market
We assume a set of network providers, denoted by J = {1, 2, .., j}, competing in the same region.
Customers are subscribed to a particular provider in return of a subscription fee, i.e., fj , for the
customers of provider j. For a customer subscribed to provider j, we call provider j as the “home
provider” and any other provider, k 6= j, k ∈ J , as a “foreign provider”.
Our subsidy-based market may result in a customer being served by a foreign provider in addition
to its subscribed home provider, depending on the received signal quality from these providers as
well as the providers’ willingness to share their infrastructure. A customer subscribed to another
provider will be treated as a “foreign customer”. But, since providers are subsidized via explicit
subsidy to share their resources, these foreign customers may get the chance to use a provider’s
resources even if they are not subscribed to that provider. This will be particularly helpful when a
customer is at a spot where its home provider has a weaker signal.
A customer i will choose j as “home provider” based on the overall signal strength/quality, ψj , and
the subscription fee, fj , of provider j. Based on these selections (to be detailed next), the number
of customers subscribing to provider j can be expressed as:
Nj = N(fj, ψj) (3.1)
where the demand function N(·) is a decreasing convex function with respect to (w.r.t.) fj and an
increasing concave function w.r.t. ψj .
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3.2.1 Customer’s Provider Selection
During a fixed time period, we assume each customer, i, on average makes γ calls. Among them,
βj,i = σ(Xj) are home calls where σ(·) is an increasing concave function w.r.t. the number of base
stations, Xj , of its home provider j. The rest of the calls are treated and served as foreign call, αj,i.
Here,
αj,i = γ − βj,i (3.2)
We assume each customer i, on average, makes γ calls during a fixed time period. Among them,
he makes βj,i = σ(Xj) home calls where σ(·) is an increasing concave function w.r.t. the number
of base stations, Xj , of his home provider j. He also makes αj,i = γ − βj,i foreign calls.
We model a customer’s selection of a home provider via its utility of the service quality. Let a
customer’s utility function, u(·), be an increasing concave function of the signal intensity/quality
of service available to that customer. Then, customer i’s overall utility from subscribing to provider
j can be expressed as:
U(i, j) = βj,iu(ψj)− fj (3.3)
Based on (3.3), customer i will select provider j as his home provider with the following probabil-
ity:
P (i, j) =
U(i, j)∑J
j=1 U(i, j)
(3.4)
We get this probabilistic provider selection from Contest Theory, [45, 46], where a customer will
most likely choose a provider which offers best utility services. We haven’t considered other se-
lection criteria, such as: a customers’ knowledge on all offered services, brand-name of a provider,
etc., we expect a customer will consider only signal quality and fees to choose a “home provider”.
Thus, a provider would attract more customers, not all of them.
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3.2.2 Provider’s Revenue Maximization
With the target of maximizing revenue, provider j receives subsidy in addition to its regular sub-
scription fees. Further, it can generate revenue by freeriding on other providers’ networks. From
(3.4), we can say, for a market with n customers, that provider j will attract Nj(= nP (i, j)) cus-
tomers with a subscription revenue of Rj(= fjNj), in a normal market. However, if provider j
joins in the SBSS market, it will get the subsidy j . From this subsidy, it can spend sj to improve its
infrastructure, e.g., by increasing the number of base stations, Xj . It also has licensed bandwidth,
bj , to run cellular operations. Available bandwidth and the number of base stations determine the
signal strength of provider j, which can be expressed as:
ψj = Q(Xj, bj) (3.5)
where Q(·) is an increasing concave function w.r.t. both Xj and bj .
Let’s assume that provider j serves FCj foreign calls, which is the proof of sharing their BSes with
other providers’ customers. The providers are penalized on their subsidy based on the number of
foreign calls they served. The higher FCj , the lower the penalty. We denote this penalty function
for provider j as:
pj = p(FCj) (3.6)
where p(·) is a decreasing convex function w.r.t. FCj .
Based on the provider selection problem (3.4), a customer i of provider j is more likely to choose
another provider k if U(i, k) ≥ U(i, j). Also, any change of subscription fees can change provider
selection criteria along with signal strength, which is the main driving factor behind U()˙. In an
SBSS market, the service utility received from providers j and k can be similar due to the subsidy
for sharing, i.e., U(i, j) ≈ U(i, k). In such a case, if fj < fk, customer i of provider k will
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more likely subscribe to provider j. Let’s assume, by advertising lower-than-fair subscription fees,
fj < fk, provider j can unfairly attract NkPcs,j subscribed customers of k, where Pcs,j is the
probability of unfair customer switching (UCS) from provider k to provider j. Now, the revenue
maximization problem for provider j becomes
max
{sj},{bj},fj
Rj + (1− pj)j − sj +
J∑
k 6=j
fj(NkPcs,j −NjPcs,k) (3.7)
sj ≤ j (3.8)
sj, bj, fj ≥ 0,∀j (3.9)
fj ≤ fk, ∀j (3.10)
The first term of (3.7) denotes the earnings of provider j from its subscribed customers. The second
term describes the leftover subsidy money of provider j, which depends on given subsidy, j , and
the penalty function, p(FCj). If provider j does not serve a satisfactory number of foreign calls, it
has to return some or all of j . The third term is the money which provider j invests from subsidy
money to improve its signal quality. Provider j has to carefully invest this subsidy money within
its regions of operation to make maximum profit, i.e., to both increase its competitiveness for more
subscribed customers and opportunities to serve more foreign calls. The fourth term delineates the
earnings from net switching customers.
25
CHAPTER 4: GAME-THEORETIC MODEL OF A TWO-PROVIDER
SBSS MARKET
Let’s consider two providers, Provider I and Provider II, under an SBSS cellular market. Here,
the maximum number of foreign calls I and II can get from the market is
∑N2
i=1 α2,i and
∑N1
i=1 α1,i
respectively. Both providers can serve up to this many foreign calls and claim more subsidy. Also,
they can take a strategic decision to limit serving foreign calls. Let’s assume that Providers I and
II are willing to serve FC1 and FC2 number of incoming foreign calls respectively, where
0 ≤ FC1 ≤
N2∑
i=1
α2,i (4.1)
0 ≤ FC2 ≤
N1∑
i=1
α1,i (4.2)
Again, we consider both providers serve foreign calls with the probabilities ω1 and ω2 respectively.
Then the total number of foreign calls served by I and II will be FC1 = ω1
∑N2
i=1 α2,i and FC2 =
ω2
∑N1
i=1 α1,i respectively. The customers of I and II can choose both providers with probabilities θ1
and θ2 when making a call under the incentivized market. Now, the overall signal quality customers
of I and II will get, respectively, are:
ψ∗1 = θ1ψ1 + (1− θ1)ψ2 (4.3)
ψ∗2 = θ2ψ2 + (1− θ2)ψ1 (4.4)
We assume that Provider I has stronger coverage, i.e., ψ1 > ψ2. So, Provider I offers better utility
than II, i.e., U(i, 1) > U(i, 2).
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If we consider the existing market and assume each provider maintains its existing business policy,
then the profit maximization problem for both providers should be:
E1 = f1nP (i, 1) + (1− p1)1 − s1 (4.5)
E2 = f2nP (i, 2) + (1− p2)2 − s2 (4.6)
However, the SBSS cellular market makes a tunnel for the weaker provider to make extra earn-
ings by freeriding on the stronger provider. Under the subsidized market, each provider’s offered
cellular utility, U(·), could become almost equal, and there may remain only a small perceived dif-
ference between cellular providers’ service quality. Assuming no changes of previously subscribed
customers’ fees and considering the possibility of UCS, the revenue maximization problem under
the subsidized market becomes
E1 = f1nP (i, 1) + (1− p1)1 − s1 + f1(N2Pcs,1 −N1Pcs,2) (4.7)
E2 = f2nP (i, 2) + (1− p2)2 − s2 + f2(N1Pcs,2 −N2Pcs,1) (4.8)
From (4.7) and (4.8), if f1 ≤ f2, most of the potential customers will go for Provider I’s service in
those areas where I has better coverage than II. This is because Provider II offers a similar utility
of service, i.e., U(i, 1) ≈ U(i, 2), with higher subscription fees under the SBSS market. So, no
freeriding takes place in this case, which is in alignment with the existing market equilibrium.
However, if Provider II aims to initiate UCS by lowering its fees, i.e., f1 > f2, then the market
equilibrium changes. Now, Provider II is able to offer similar utility, i.e., U(i, 1) ≈ U(i, 2), with
lower subscription fees. This will attract the subscribed customers of I to II. Provider I will lose its
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customers to II, even though it has a stronger signal. Here, Provider I will get subsidy money for
serving these foreign calls. If no subsidy agreement exists, Provider I could consider these earnings
as the revenue from subscribed customers. However, depending on the Subsidizing Organization’s
offerings, this subsidy money can be less than the subscription revenue lost due to II’s freeriding.
As a result, UCS can demotivate Provider I from the SBSS market. We model the number of
unfairly switching customers from each provider as a function, F (.), which is increasing concave
w.r.t. the provider’s own subscription fees and decreasing convex w.r.t. the other provider’s fees.
That is, for Providers I and II, we express this as:
N l1 = F (f1, f2) (4.9)
N l2 = F (f2, f1) (4.10)
4.1 Two-Provider Game Formation
To model the freeriding problem, we envision a simple 2x2 non-cooperative strategic form game.
The two players are a large provider and a small provider. They are competing in an area where the
large provider is able to offer much better service than the small provider. Now consider customers
not subscribed to the large provider, who venture into this area and wish to make calls. The large
provider then has a decision to make: it can either cover such calls or else not cover them. Covering
them has the benefit of earning subsidy profit from the Subsidizing Organization, but runs the risk
of the freeriding problem described below.
At the same time, the small provider decides whether to “undercut” the large provider, by offering
low-fee service to these customers. If the large provider is “covering” these customers’ calls, the
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small provider can freeride, i.e., it enrolls the customers by offering the low-fee service, collects
the fees, but doesn‘t have to provide any better service because the large firm is doing so by sharing
its base stations with these customers.
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Figure 4.1: 2x2 Game Model for Freeriding
The situation outlined above is modeled by the simple 2x2 non-cooperative strategic form game in
Fig. 4.1. The two strategies for the large provider (or “Player I” or “The Row Player”) are listed
on the left, while those for the small provider (“Player II” or “The Column Player”) are across the
top. The four possible outcomes are represented by the four cells. Of interest here is the freeriding
outcome in the top left (if the large provider “covers calls” and the small provider charges “low
fees”). Also note that there is another outcome which the Subsidizing Organization would prefer
over the freeriding outcome, namely for the large provider to cover foreign calls, but for the small
provider to charge fair market fees and so no freeriding occurs. This is the top right cell of the
bimatrix.
The two entries in each cell represent the payoffs for Player I (large provider) and Player II (small
provider), respectively, if the players play the corresponding strategies. For example, if the large
provider does not cover calls while the small provider charges low fees, the payoff is e for the large
provider and f for the small provider.
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We now derive expressions for the quantities a, b, ..., h. We begin by simplifying (3.7) above to
E1 = N1f1 + (1− p1)1 + f1(N l2 −N l1) (4.11)
E2 = N2f2 + (1− p2)2 + f2(N l1 −N l2) (4.12)
respectively. For simplicity, we have dropped spending amounts, s1, s2, from the payoffs and
assumed only Provider I is losing customers to Provider II. As a result, we have N l1 > 0 and
N l2 = 0. Also, Provider II cannot earn subsidy money as it’s not sharing (0 ≤ p1 < 1, p2 = 1) the
spectrum.
Table 4.1: Each Provider’s Payoff
Symbol Value
a N1f1 + (1− p1)1 −N l1f1
b N2f2 +N
l
1f2
c N1f1 + (1− p1)1
d N2f
∗
2
e N1f1
f N2f2
g N1f1
h N2f
∗
2
We have denoted the fair market fee or reservation price as f ∗2 for Provider II. Alternatively, f2 is
the undercutting low fee Provider II could charge. Using (4.11) and (4.12), we present expressions
for a, b, ..., h in Table 4.1.
Provider I and provider II get payoff a and b respectively when provider I is covering the calls and
provider II is charging lower fees. This is the case when freeriding occurs and provider I loses
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revenue due to UCS by provider II. In the same time, I is earning subsidy as it is sharing spectrum
and the UCS customers from the provider I are contributing to provider II’s revenue. c and d are
the payoffs of provider I and provider II respectively when provider I covers the calls and provider
II charges fair market fees. This is the desired case when no UCS takes place. As the provider I is
sharing spectrum, it continues earning subsidy here. When provider I doesn’t cover any calls and
provider II charges low fees, the payoffs for the provider I and II becomes e and f respectively.
Payoffs g and h refers to the existing revenue earning scenario for provider I and provider II when
no sharing takes place and provider II charges fair market fees.
Observing above defined payoffs, we can say e = g, g < c and a < c which remain unchanged
always. In case of payoffs e and g, provider I doesn’t cover any calls. So there remains no op-
portunity of UCS. Which ensures the equal revenue (e = g) earning of provider I in both cases.
The provider I earns subsidy by covering calls along with regular subscription revenues when the
provider II charges fair fees which results in the payoff c. It earns g when it’s not covering any
calls and provider II is charging fair market fees which mean no subsidy earning for provider I.
From this two conditions, we can say g < c. Again, based on our assumption, we know provider
I loses customers to provider II due to UCS when provider II charges low fees. From here, we
can say a < c. Only changing relationship is found between a and e. If (1 − p1)1 − N l1f1 from
a results in any positive value then we get a > e. This can happen if the government gives too
much subsidy to the provider I or the penalty (p1) of provider I becomes too small compared to the
revenue loss due to UCS or both. In this case, provider I can overcome revenue loss occurred by
UCS customers. If none of these happen then payoff a becomes smaller than payoff e. Another
situation may arise when we observe a = e. This can happen if revenue loss due to UCS becomes
equal to subsidy earning from spectrum sharing.
From the payoffs of provider II, we find that the unchanged conditions under any circumstances
are f < h, h = d and f < b. As the provider I doesn’t cover calls so lowering fees will generate
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less revenue for provider II which holds the inequality of f < h. Again as per our assumption,
provider II doesn’t share its spectrum, so it earns equal revenue (h = d) in cases when Provider II
charges fair fees and Provider I covers calls or doesn’t. When provider two charges low fees, it will
get additional revenues if provider I covers calls compared to provider I doesn’t cover. Covering
calls of customers of provider II creates the opportunity of additional earning for provider II by
triggering UCS which holds the condition f < b. The only changing relationship is found between
payoffs b and d. When the numbers of UCS customers are large and the fees charged by II are
closer to fair market fees then we can observe the scenario where payoff b becomes larger than d.
Again, if the numbers of UCS customers are small or the asking fees are too small compared to
the fair market fees then we get the opposite relation (d > b). Also, d = b can be found. This
happens when the loss occurred by lowering fees becomes equal to the revenue earning from UCS
customers.
From these, we see that the following relationships necessarily hold: e = g, g < c, a < c, f < h,
h = d, and f < b. These relationships are used in all four equilibrium cases detailed later.
We now analyze this game using standard non-cooperative game theory. A mixed strategy for
Player I is a two component vector (p, 1 − p) in which p (≥0) represents the probability that he
will cover all calls and 1-p is the probability he doesn’t. Similarly, a mixed strategy for Player II is
given by (q, 1− q), in which q is the probability that she charges low fees. Given mixed strategies
for each player, it is easy to calculate the expected payoff for each player: pqa+ p(1− q)c+ (1−
p)qe+ (1− p)(1− q)g for Player I and pqb+ p(1− q)d+ (1− p)qf + (1− p)(1− p)h for Player
II.
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A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a pair of mixed strategies, one for each player, in which both players
are maximizing their expected payoff given what the other is doing. It is the most used solution
concept in noncooperative game theory, and we use it here to analyze the game above.
Considering uncertain relationships between a, e and b, d, we get four different cases for the game.
They are:
Case I (a < e AND d < b). This is the interesting case, with no dominating strategies. The unique
NE is for Player I to play (p∗, 1−p∗) and Player II to play (q∗, 1−q∗), where p∗ = (h− f)/(b− f)
and q∗ = (c− g)/(c− a).
Now observe what happens if the Subsidizing Organization raises the ‘reward’ to the large provider
for covering calls. This raises both a and c by the same amount, say x. For small x, the effect is to
raise q∗, i.e., to make the small provider more likely to undersell. If x = e−a, there is a continuum
of NEs, all with q∗ = 1, i.e., all with small provider underselling. Finally, if x > e− a, the unique
NE outcome is the freeriding outcome of p∗ = q∗ = 1. Hence, we see how the Subsidizing
Organization raising the subsidy triggers the freeriding problem.
So, how can the Subsidizing Organization encourage its desired outcome? It merely needs to raise
the payoffs (to small provider) for not underselling. In terms of our bimatrix, this would raise the
quantities d and h. If done in conjunction with the subsidy idea above, it could force the NE to be
desired the outcome, i.e., p∗ = 1 and q∗ = 0. In practice, this can be done by either erecting a
price floor for phone service (so that charging too small a fee is a crime), or perhaps by allowing
providers to keep more of their fees via lowering particular penalties on the subsidy benefits by the
Subsidizing Organization.
Case II (a ≥ e AND d < b). In this case, covering calls is a dominating strategy for the large
provider (i.e. it is best for the large provider to cover calls, no matter what the small provider
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does). Since d < b, the small provider’s best response to this is to charge low fees. Hence the
unique NE is the freeriding outcome.
Case III ((d > b AND any comparative relation between a AND e) OR (a < e AND d = b)). In
this case, charging high fees is a dominating strategy for the small provider. Since c > g, the large
provider’s best response to this is to cover calls. Hence, the unique NE is the desired freeriding-free
outcome.
Case IV (a ≥ e AND d = b). When a game forms like this, we get a continuum of NEs. For all
NEs, Player I covers calls. Player II can play any mixed strategy.
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CHAPTER 5: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF A TWO-PROVIDER
SBSS MARKET
In Chapter 4, we observe different NEs of a two-provider game based on different game conditions.
In this Chapter, we will perform quantitative analysis of these NEs using simulation. To analyze
the providers’ problem in an SBSS market, we consider a two-provider game within a single region
where one is a large provider and another is a small provider. In the simulation, we will find cus-
tomer utility, demand, and call quality first. After that, we will analyze customers’ price averseness
and UCS functions which are used to determine game NEs. After running the game simulation,
we observe the game equilibriums and find the strategies associated with each NE. Then, we find
the effect of government subsidy on determining NE. We also observe the freeriding effect of a
large subsidy. Marginal Signal Improvement (MSI) has a significant contribution on determining
NE. We analyze its effect on equilibrium. Small provider’s UCS strategy can contribute to shifting
the game NE from one state to another. Similarly, large provider’s willingness to share also plays
a big role in determining NE. We have simulated the effects of both (small and large) providers’
such strategies and finally illustrated the observed NE.
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Table 5.1: Initial Parameters
Parameter Value
n 1000
ω1, ω2 0.8, 0
D 100
MSI 0.8
X1, X2 70, 30
n1, n2 nX1X1+X2 ,
nX2
X1+X2
f ∗1 , f
∗
2
n1
XMSI1
, n2
XMSI2
V1, V2 n1f ∗1 , n2f
∗
2
Tmv V1 + V2
1, 2 0.05Tmv, 0
5.1 Experimental Setup
We assume Provider I is the larger provider. Table 5.1 describes the initial parameters where n and
D denote the number of customers within the experimental region and the total number of calls
each customer makes respectively. We assume Providers I and II have X1(= 70) and X2(= 30)
base stations and their willingness to share are initialized to ω1 = 0.8 and ω2 = 0. A 35 × 35
square grid is considered as the experimental region. Base stations of each provider were set up
randomly in this square region. We calculate the number of customers, n1, n2, subscribed to each
provider based on the number of base stations each provider has. We select a customers’ position
in the square region randomly.
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Figure 5.1: Signal Quality w.r.t. MSI
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Figure 5.2: Utility w.r.t. MSI
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5.1.1 Customer Utility and Demand
We model a customers’ perceived signal utility from Providers I and II as u1 = log(Q1) and u2 =
log(Q2), respectively. We model the signal quality as an increasing concave function of X and
decreasing convex function of the number of customers. In particular, we use Q1 = XMSI1 /n1 and
Q2 = X
MSI
2 /n2 to represent the offered signal quality to the customers of Providers I and II, where
the Marginal Signal Improvement, MSI , is a constant expressing the benefit of having more base
stations on the signal strength. To assure concavity, MSI must be in (0, 1). It describes, within a
fixed size region, how the marginal improvement on the offered signal quality will diminish w.r.t.
the number of base stations. As shown in Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.2, the small provider’s offered signal
quality and utility will improve more than a large providers’ if we increase the number of base
stations by the same amount. In our experiments, we chose a default value of MSI = 0.8 for both
providers as this value attains a solid concave signal quality and logarithmic utility.
MSI also helps to determine fair market fees for both providers. Using the marginal utilities, u′1
and u′2, we define the fair market fees as: f
∗
1 = u
′
1 = 1/Q1 = n1/X
MSI
1 and f
∗
2 = u
′
2 = 1/Q2 =
n2/X
MSI
2 . For MSI < 1, we get f
∗
1 > f
∗
2 which is expected in a normal market where market
leaders charge more. Using fair market fees, we determine both providers’ market values, V1, V2,
and the total market value, Tmv, Table 5.1.
5.1.2 Call Quality
To measure the signal strength, ψ, of each provider, we have considered the distance from a caller
to the base station. We have defined ψ1 = 1/d21 and ψ2 = 1/d
2
2 where d1 and d2 represent the
distance from a customer to the nearest base station of Provider I and Provider II, respectively. The
lower the distance is, the better the signal. As we are considering a simplified game model where
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only Provider I is willing to share (ω1 > 0, ω2 = 0), so all calls of its customers are considered
as home calls. However, for Provider II, this depends on the signal strength of both providers. If
the nearest base station is one of Provider I’s, then the decision to serve as a foreign call is made
based on a random number ranged between 0 to 1. If the generated number is less than or equal
to ω1 then it is served by Provider I. Otherwise, Provider II serves as a home call. Considering the
randomness of the locations of base stations, the positions of customers and determining of foreign
vs. home call, we have run our simulation experiment 7 times and took the average of them when
calculating the call qualities ψ1 and ψ2.
Table 5.2: Intermediate Variables
Variable Name Symbol
Number of foreign calls served FC1, FC2
Total foreign calls to Provider I FCt
Penalty p1, p2
Signal strength ψ1, ψ2
Probability of unfair customer switching Pcs,1, Pcs,2
Number of home calls β1,i, β2,i
Number of foreign calls α1,i, α2,i
5.1.3 Price Averseness (C) and Unfair Customer Switching
When simulating the equilibrium strategies of the game, we need to calculate a few intermediate
variables as listed in Table 5.2. From the count of home and foreign calls made by each customer
i, we get the values for β1,i, β2,i, α1,i and α2,i. The probability of UCS, Pcs,2, is one of the key
factors of freeriding. If the perceived signal quality by Provider II’s customers, ψ∗2 , is greater than
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or equal to the perceived signal quality by Provider I’s customers, ψ∗1 , and the fair market fee of
Provider I, f ∗1 , is higher than any low fees of Provider II, f2, then we model the probability of the
UCS initiated by Provider II as: Pcs,2 = 1− e−Cf∗1 /f2 . In this model, we introduce C as customers’
averseness to price, Fig. 5.3. It ranges from 0 to 1. When C is high, customers averseness with
price is also high. In a normal market, we believe customers are very averse with the price. Hence
we use a high default value for C: C = 0.9
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Figure 5.3: Effect of Price Averseness on Pcs,2
Fig. 5.4 and 5.5 describe the equilibrium strategies for both providers on a set of C. If customers
are not too price averse, Provider I’s higher sharing region increases. When it is too low (C =
0.01), Provider I plays higher sharing pure strategy always. However, in a real market, customers
are price averse. As a result, with the increase of C, Provider I is more interested to play mixed
strategy. Due to UCS, Provider I’s lost customers n1Pcs,2, can range between 0 to n1 depending on
Pcs,2. When f ∗1 /f2 ≈ ∞, we get Pcs,2 ≈ 1. And if f ∗1 /f2 ≈ 0, we have Pcs,2 ≈ 0.
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Figure 5.6: Always on Sharing w.r.t. Price Averseness
Fig. 5.6 gives us the idea of Provider I’s always on sharing (covering all foreign calls) pure strategy
region related to Provider I’s and Provider II’s fees ratio. It tells us the fees ratio (f2/f ∗1 ) up-to
which Provider I will play higher sharing pure strategy whatever Provider II does. Above this fees
ratio, Provider I starts playing mixed strategy. We observe that, with the increase of C and MSI ,
Provider I is more willing to share its spectrum resource. If MSI is higher, a spectrum sharing
provider can tolerate higher price averseness and continue high sharing. Also, If we increase the
amount of subsidy, the region of always on sharing up to agreed willingness to share increases.
For this case, we have considered ω1 as 80%. Our assumption of this high value of ω1 comes from
the experiment (described in Subsubsection 5.2.4) where we found that for any given subsidy, our
model can ensure Provider I to play pure strategy up to 69% of willingness to share approximately.
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Figure 5.7: Equilibrium Strategies w.r.t. Fees Ratio
5.2 Results at Equilibrium
Both providers change their strategic decisions with the change of game scenario which generates
a new NE. The subsidy amount also has a significant contribution to changing NEs of a game. The
excessive subsidy can drive a game from a non-freeriding to a freeriding regime.
5.2.1 Strategies of Large and Small Providers at Equilibrium
From the experimental results, Fig. 5.7 describes the scenario where we have plotted the strategy
taken by Provider I, p∗, and the strategy taken by Provider II, q∗, against the ratio, r. We have
taken 30, 50 and 70 different data points between the ranges 0 ≤ r ≤ 0.199, 0.2 ≤ r ≤ 0.4
and 0.41 ≤ r ≤ 1 respectively for the evaluation. Here, we draw the graph with three different
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willingness to share (ω1 = 0.3, 0.8, 0.96) of Provider I. That player is found to play a less sharing
strategy (lowering p∗) with the increase of ω1 if we continue to increase the fee of Provider II
towards the fair market fee, i.e., r−− > 1. This is because increasing the fee nearer to fair market
fee causes less revenue loss for Provider II and switched customers add more revenue to Provider
II. As a result, Provider II is willing to play undersell more (higher q∗). This revenue loss scenario
forces Provider I to play less sharing most of the time. However, we have found a transition of p∗
from pure strategy, p∗ = 1, to a mixed strategy between fees ratio, r = 0.41 to r = 0.42. This r
(= 0.41) is the terminal sharing percentage up-to which Provider I can play pure strategy, p∗ = 1,
without facing any loss. From the test cases, if ω1 = 0.3, our game ensures no freeriding. When
ω1 = 0.8 or 0.96, freeriding takes place and Provider I changes its strategy. Instead of playing pure
strategy it starts playing mixed strategy to overcome the loss due to UCS. Thus, it is possible to
ensure market healthiness and provide subsidy to spectrum sharing provider.
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Figure 5.8: Equilibrium Strategies w.r.t. Willingness to Share (ω1)
Fig. 5.8 describes the situation where we have plotted the strategies p∗ and q∗ against the willing-
ness to share, ω1, of Provider I. We have considered 50, 90 and 10 different data points between
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the ranges 0 ≤ ω1 ≤ 0.599, 0.6 ≤ ω1 ≤ 0.9 and 0.91 ≤ ω1 ≤ 1 respectively for this simula-
tion. Here, we have plotted the graph for three different values of r = 0.3, 0.8, 0.96. Similar to
the previous graph, we find that Provider I is more willing to play less sharing with the increase
of fees of Provider II to the fair market fee. The closer to the fair market fee of Provider II with
the same sharing percentage by Provider I, the more earning by Provider II. As a result, we found
that Provider II will charge low fees which forces Provider I to share less most of the time. We
observe both players play the freeriding-free pure strategy, p∗ = 1, q∗ = 0, when r = 0.3. For the
case of r = 0.8 or 0.96, both players play a mixed strategy above a certain willingness to share.
We have seen a transition phase of p∗ (from 1 to a proper fraction) when the sharing is 0.69. As
we calculate p∗ with the fraction of (h − f) to (b − f), it is expected to reduce p∗ to that level
where the fraction is located. We also observe that both providers maintain the same strategy for
certain period of willingness to share. During this period, Provider II cannot start UCS anymore.
We calculate p∗ based on the payoff of Provider II. As low fees, f2, and fair fee, f ∗2 , of Provider II
remains unchanged while changing willingness to share, the fraction of (h−f) to (b−f) gives the
same result as no more switched customers have subscribed to Provider II. This also encourages
Provider I to follow the same strategy for certain period.
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Figure 5.9: Equilibrium Strategies for Different Fees Ratio (r = f2/f ∗2 )
5.2.2 Effect of Subsidy on Equilibrium
We draw graphs which describe the scenario where equilibrium points shift with the changing
of given subsidy to Provider I. Fig. 5.9 delineates the cases where equilibrium points are found
against three different values of r = 0.3, 0.8, 0.96, and Fig. 5.10 describes the case where we graph
w.r.t. three different willingnesses to share (ω1 = 0.3, 0.8, 0.96) for Provider I. We have considered
100 different subsidy amounts between 0% and 4.5% of Tmv for this run. We have seen that with
the increase of Provider II’s fees closer to fair market fees, Provider I is less interested in sharing.
However, if we continue increasing the subsidy, Provider I is finally able to overcome its loss due
to unfair customer switching. Additional subsidy encourages it to play the most sharing strategy,
p∗ = 1. Also, we observe the start of freeriding from here. We have seen, when ω1 = 0.3, Provider
I and Provider II play p∗ = 1 and q∗ = 0 respectively. When ω1 = 0.8 and ω1 = 0.96, Provider
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I and Provider II play mixed strategies up to 1 = 0.238Tmv and 1 = 0.139Tmv respectively.
After reaching these 1’s, freeriding takes place. Fig. 5.10 tells the same story from a different
perspective. Higher willingness to share of Provider I with the same r (= 0.9) encourages Provider
II to undersell mostly, and this forces Provider I to a play less sharing strategy. In case of ω1 = 0.8,
if we continue increasing the subsidy to Provider I, finally it is able to overcome the customer loss
when 1 = 0.202Tmv, which encourages Provider I to share more (p∗ = 1). In this case, Provider
II continues its mixed strategy onwards. We find the start of freeriding when the subsidy amount
is 1 = 0.175Tmv where ω1 = 0.96.
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Figure 5.10: Equilibrium Strategies for Different Willingness to Share (ω1) and Subsidy of
Provider I
5.2.3 Effect of Marginal Signal Improvement (MSI)
Equilibrium strategies w.r.t. different MSI values have been shown in Fig. 5.11 and 5.12. If we
increase same weight on MSI for both providers, Provider I’s higher sharing region increases.
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This happens due to two reasons, (1) the higher the MSI is, the closer each other’s fees are,
and (2) if the customers get equal improvement on signal strength from both providers, the large
provider still remain ahead of the small provider. As a result, unfair customer switching probability
remains lower, which encourages Provider I for higher sharing. We also observe, if MSI remains
higher Provider I can switch to play higher sharing pure strategy from a mixed strategy, Fig. 5.12.
Because, higher sharing makes more profit from the subsidy in spite of low customer loss. It
happens when Provider II’s charging fee stays near to fair market fee. In such competitive market,
a little subsidy is well enough to drive a provider for higher sharing. In a case, whereMSI = 0.95,
the ratio of a low fee, f2, to fair market fee, f ∗2 , of Provider II, r = 0.93, subsidy 1(= 0.045Tmv)
is well enough to motivate Provider I to switch from a mixed strategy to the higher sharing pure
strategy. Initially, the willingness to share is set to ω1 = 0.8 and ω2 = 0. For determining penalty
on given subsidy to Provider I, we used a linear penalty, p1, where p1 = 1− FC1/FCt.
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Figure 5.13: Equilibrium Strategies and Payoffs with different fees ratio (r = f2/f ∗2 )
5.2.4 Weak Provider’s Effort to Trigger Unfair Customer Switching
Equilibrium strategies against given subsidy to Provider I and for a given set of fees ratio has been
described in Fig. 5.13. When Provider II’s ratio of fee to fair market fee is 30%, we see both
providers are interested to play freeriding-free pure strategies, i.e., p∗ = 1 and q∗ = 0. With
the increase of this ratio, both change their pure strategies to a mixed strategy. When ω1 = 0.69,
for any r and given subsidy 1, our model ensures a freeriding-free PSNE. However, any further
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increase of r, 1, ω1, equilibrium leads us in a region where Provider I covers calls and Provider
II lowers fees. This happens because UCS was triggered by Provider II and additional subsidy
earning by Provider I. We also see different freeriding starting points for different ω1, 1 and r.
High subsidy continues freeriding output. However, this situation compromises the ideal market.
We also observe that when r = 0.8, Provider II’s maximum revenue earning is greater compared
to the revenue earning when r = 0.95. It happens because of UCS, the more Provider II’s fee is
closer to its fair market fee, the lower UCS is. And, it ensures less customer loss by Provider I. If
we observe the revenue earnings of Provider I, we see its earning is higher with a higher value of
r. However, there exists a threshold value of r, bellow which UCS cannot guarantee Provider II to
earn at least its regular revenue. As a result, Provider II doesn’t play freeriding strategy (q∗ = 1).
Here, r = 0.3 is located within the range of that threshold to r = 0. We also observe that, in this
case, Provider II’s maximum revenue is higher compared to two more values of r.
Fig. 5.14 describes both providers equilibrium strategies and payoffs w.r.t. to ω1. When ω1 = 0.4,
both providers play the freeriding free PSNE. With the increase of sharing, both switch to a mixed
strategy. However, when the fees ratio r is high, the game exhibits a freeriding equilibrium with
the increase of subsidy. The more willingness to share, the more we get the freeriding equilibrium
when all game conditions remain unchanged. From Fig. 5.14b and Fig. 5.14c, when r ≤ 0.41, it
ensures both providers to form freeriding-free PSNE. Above of this ratio, we observe both players
adjust their pure strategy to mixed strategy for maximizing their profit. In this case, r = 0.41 is the
threshold value of r, bellow which Provider II isn’t interested to play freeriding strategy q∗ = 1 to
make the profit from UCS. The higher ω1, the higher freeriding PSNE. Higher sharing encourages
Provider II to play customers’ switching strategy, (q∗ = 1), and higher subsidy amount minimizes
revenue loss of Provider I. These two conditions help to continue freeriding PSNE when sharing is
too high. The brighter an area is, the more earning for a provider.
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Figure 5.14: Equilibrium Strategies and Payoffs with different Willingness to Share (ω1)
5.2.5 Large Provider’s Willingness to Share
Higher sharing is expected in the SBSS market. However, higher sharing increases the chance
of revenue loss for the provider who shares spectrum. Lowering fee is beneficial for the smaller
provider which gets the benefits of sharing. If the fees are too low compared to fair market fee,
lowering fees can be a bad move on its’ own. There is a willingness to share, below which any
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sharing can be done with PSNE. After that percentage of sharing, players are interested in choosing
a mixed strategy. From our experiment, we can say there exists a value of ω1 (here it is 0.69), below
which any sharing percentage ensures Provider I to play p∗ = 1 and Provider II to play q∗ = 0.
Also, other NEs ensure at least the earnings from unshared market for both Providers. From the
payoffs of all cases, we observed that Provider I earns at least its regular earning which it can
earn while not taking part in SBSS market. In the freeriding PSNE, both providers earn more
than the earnings of existing cellular market. From such observations, a spectrum sharing provider
can make a strategic decision to limit service of foreign calls. In this way, the spectrum sharing
provider’s strategic decision guarantees it at least the earnings of an unshared spectrum market.
Also, the freeriding PSNE gives the incentivizing organization an idea of how much subsidy should
be given to large provider to stop freeriding.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
Freeriding is always harmful to any stable market. In computer communication networks, freerid-
ers may arise in different forms. There already exist different countermeasures against them. How-
ever, in the cellular market, due to the static licensing of spectrum allocations, such freeriders
haven’t arisen previously. Now, cellular users are increasing rapidly which requires more spec-
trum utilization and more sharing to accommodate a huge number of cellular devices. Different
approaches have already been taken to increase spectrum utilization, e.g., dynamic spectrum shar-
ing among providers. Monetary transactions are mostly found in this types of sharing. However,
it may cost additional money of the customers eventually. Government subsidy-based spectrum
sharing may reduce this burden from the users. However, it also creates tunnels for the opportunis-
tic freeriding providers which can interrupt existing market healthiness, trigger unfair customer
switching and create an unstable cellular market.
In this thesis, we have discussed a subsidy-based spectrum sharing model, where the amount of
customers’ switching triggered by a smaller provider can be reduced and the earnings of large
providers’ remain at least as much as the earnings from the existing unshared spectrum market.
Here, we have developed a game-theoretic framework which can ensure a large provider to serve up
to a certain sharing percentage of total incoming foreign calls for all times. Above this willingness
to share, our model helps both providers to maintain a mixed strategy to control freeriding. Also,
there exists a fees ratio, below which a spectrum sharing provider can always share. We have
considered customers’ price averseness to determine customer switching probability. Also, we
have shown the impact of subsidy in an SBSS cellular market.
We have considered a two-provider non-cooperative game for SBSS markets. We leave the more-
than-two provider game as future work. Also, the exploration of the signal strength indicator,
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MSI , is another worthy future work. Here, we have only used the same MSI for both providers.
In a competitive market with probable higher signal improvement, a little subsidy can motivate
a provider for higher sharing. Also, different MSI values can be used to run this experiment.
It may substantially increase/ decrease the size of the desired/undesired equilibrium regions of
our experiment. Also, we have not considered Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) as
part of the game-theoretic model. As such virtual operators without any infrastructure are being
considered, looking at the effect of such operators on the SBSS markets will be an interesting
direction to take.
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APPENDIX : SYMBOLS AND NOTATIONS
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n = Number of total customers
σ(·) = Function to calculate number of home calls made by each customer
βj,i = Number of home calls made by each customer i of provider j
αj,i = Number of outside calls made by each customer i of provider j
γ = Number of total calls made by each customer
fj = The fees charged by provider j to its customers
ψj = The intensity/quality of provider j
′s signal
Xj = Provider j
′s number of base stations
bj = Government subsidy to Provider j
Q(.) = An increasing concave function takes Xj and bj to calculate ψj
u(.) = Customers′ utility function, parameterized with received signal intensity ψj
U(i, j) = Overall utility determining function of customer i by choosing provider j
P (i, j) = Probabilistic function to choose provider j by customer i
SO = Subsidizing Organization
j = Explicit subsidy amount that provider j receives from an SO
 = Total subsidy budget of an incentivizing organization
Rj = Provider j
′s revenue from subscribed customers only
Ej = Provider j
′s overall revenue
sj = A portion of the amount j that provider j spends for infrastructure
FCj = Number of outside calls that provider j serves
ωj = Provider j
′s willingness to share
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N lj = Number of customers lost by provider j
Nj = Number of customers of provider j
p(·) = Proportionate subsidy returning penalty function
Pcs,j = Probability of unfair customer switching initiated by provider j
UCS = Unfair Customer Switching
BS = Base Station
SBSS = Subsidy −Based Spectrum Sharing
PSS = Pervasive Spectrum Sharing
PSC = Public Safety Communication
RAN = Radio Access Network
MNO =Mobile Network Operator
MV NO =Mobile V irtual Network Operator
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